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CASE NOTES
Federal standard is applied there would be nothing to prevent the States from
frustrating Federal tax liens by statutorily labeling what now is characterized
a lien as a property transfer from debtor to creditor.
The Durham classification could equally have satisfied the definition of
a lien in the nature of a "mechanic's lien" which by virtue of § 67 of the
Bankruptcy Act" would be valid even though made while the debtor was
insolvent and within four (4) months of the petition of Bankruptcy, but
would have been subjected to the Federal standard of "choateness" in order
to qualify as a prior lien with respect to the Federal tax lien. However, since
such transmutation was characterized by the State, or by the Federal Court's
interpretation of the State law, as a property transfer, the Court never reaches
the Federal question of the priority of liens. The Court in the Durham case
accepted the State law determination as not unreasonable but failed to discuss
the merits of the characterization. It cannot he determined from the cases
what standard of reasonableness, if any, the Court is applying when viewing
State property classifications but it would not be too conjectural to anticipate
an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act defining exactly what property classifi-
cation will be reasonable, based probably on a standard of "ownership inci-
dents," if State law should develop so as to frustrate the Federal tax lien.
However, even if such an eventuality were to transpire, an assignment for
the benefit of creditors, as in the instant case, should most readily satisfy any
reasonable standard.
Ch ARLES D. FERRIS
Banks—Forged Checks—Recovery by the Drawee Bank.— Mechanics
National Bank of Worcester v. Worcester County Trust Company.1—
On September 9, 1952, an unknown man presented a $3940 check to a teller
at the defendant Worcester County Trust Company (hereinafter referred
to as the Trust Co.). The check, dated September 5, 1952, was drawn on
the plaintiff National Bank of Worcester (hereafter referred to as National),
payable to "cash" and signed "Anthony A. Borgatti." It was indorsed
"Ralph Scala." The stranger also presented a deposit slip in the amount of
$340 in the name of Ralph Scola, which was the name of one of the Trust
Co.'s depositors. The indorsement and the deposit slip signatures were not
in the same handwriting and the "S" in "Scala" had been scratched over.
The Trust Co.'s teller took the check and deposit slip from the stranger
without requiring identification and without comparing the signatures with
the signature of Scola in the files. National's bookkeeper informed the Trust
Co.'s teller by telephone that National had no account in the name of the
drawer but had one in the name of "Brigida Borgatti, Conservator for
Antonio Borgatti." The teller then credited Scola's account with the $340
15 30 Stat. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).
1 170 N.E.2d 476 (Mass. 1960).
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deposit and paid over $3600 to the stranger. The Trust Co. indorsed the
check, stating that it was payable to "the order of any bank, banker or
Trust Co." and that "prior indorsements [were] guaranteed." On Sep-
tember 10, 1952, the Trust Co., as holder, presented the check for payment
at Worcester Clearing House and National paid it by crediting the Trust
Co.'s clearing house balance. National then charged the check to the Con-
servator's account. On September 19, 1952, National learned that the
signatures of the drawer and Scola were forgeries and immediately notified
the defendant Trust Co. Upon hearing that its depositor, Scola, knew noth-
ing of the $340 deposit, the Trust Co. charged this amount to his account and
paid it to National. National, seeking recovery of the $3600, brought suit
in the Superior Court and a judgment was rendered in its favor. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed. HELD: Plaintiff drawee
was entitled to recover from the defendant-cashing bank for money paid
under a mistake of fact.
To the general rule that money paid under a mistake of fact can be
recovered, the early English case of Price v. Neale engrafted an important
exception, i.e., that as between equally innocent parties the drawee must
suffer the loss resulting from its failure to detect the forgery of its depositor's
signatures Most jurisdictions hold that the rule of Price v. Neal is itself
subject to an exception, which permits recovery by the drawee of money
paid on a forged check from one guilty of bad faith or negligence in taking
the check. 4 This exception is most frequently invoked to permit recovery
against a bank or other party who received a forged check from a stranger
without identification' The Court, in the instant case, held Price v. Neal
inapplicable stating that the situation was controlled by First National Bank
of Danvers v. First National Bank of Salem,° which illustrates the application
of the above mentioned latter exception to a bearer check?
2 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
3 This is because a drawee of a draft is presumed to know the signature of his
customer, the drawer.
4 A hint of this exception is found in Price v. Neal itself, for in his opinion Lord
Mansfield observed that "if there was any fault or negligence in any one, it certainly
was in the plaintiff (drawee) and not in the defendant (holder).
5 National Bank of North America of Boston v. Bangs, 106 Mass. 441 (1871)
holds that in a Price v. Neal situation the drawee may recover the money if paid to
a holder who purchased it from a stranger. Accord: First National Bank of Danvers v.
First National Bank of Salem, 151 Mass. 280, 24 N.E. 44 (1890); State Bank of
Chicago v. First National Bank of Omaha, 87 Neb. 351, 127 N.W. 244 (1910); Ellis &
Morton v. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co., 4 Ohio St. 628 (1855) ; Greenwald v. Ford, 21
S.D. 28, 109 N.W. 516 (1906); People's Bank v. Franklin Bank, 88 Tenn. 299, 12 S.W.
716 (1838). Contra: Howard v. Mississippi Valley Bank, 28 La. Ann, 727 (1876);
Commercial & Farmers' Bank of Baltimore v. First National Bank of Baltimore, 30 Md.
11 (1868); Salt Springs Bank v. Syracuse Savings Inst., 62 Barb. (N.Y.) 101 (1863);
Bank of St. Albans v. Farmers' & M. Bank, 10 Vt. 141 (1838),
6 151 Mass. 280, 24 N.E. 44 (1890).
7
 In that case, the plaintiff-drawee was permitted to recover from the defendant,
which cashed for a stranger a forged check payable to "Joel Kimball or bearer," despite
the rule of Price v. Neal.
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Section 62 of the NIL states that:
"The acceptor by accepting the instrument engages that he will
pay according to the tenor of his acceptance; and admits-1. The
existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature, and his
capacity and authority to draw the instrument . . . ."
It is thus seen that Section 62 makes no explicit mention of forged checks,
nor does it grant an exemption to the liability of the drawee when a forged
check has been accepted by it under circumstances similar to those in the
present case. But, several American courts have held that the NIL in-
corporates not only the doctrine of Price v. Neal but also the exception
which allows the drawee to recover from the person to whom payment is
made on a showing of the negligence, fraud or bad faith of such persoms
How the holder's negligence affects the liability of the drawee has, however,
presented some difficulty. Such negligence has been found to be immaterial
when it appeared that the drawee was also negligent in making payment of
an instrument on which the drawer's signature had been forged; the drawee's
negligence in such a case has been termed "negligence at law" or constructive
negligence .a
For a drawee to recover in Massachusetts it must be shown not only
that the defendant-cashing-bank contributed to the success of the fraud
or mistake of fact under which payment was made, but also, that the drawee
was free from actual fault. 1 ° Since, in the instant case, no question of fraud
is raised, the decision is correct under the common law of Massachusetts
only if the Trust Co. is guilty of bad faith or negligence"- and there is an
absence of actual fault on the part of the plaintiff-drawee. 12
8 The courts assume that the doctrine of Price v. Neal, with all its common law
exceptions, real or apparent, have been carried into the Act or are available through
§ 196 NIL. Citizen's Bank of Fayette v. J. Blach & Sons, Inc., 228 Ala. 246, 153
So. 404 (1934); First Nat'l Bank of Orleans v. State Bank of Almo, 22 Neb. 769, 36
N.W. 289 (1888); First Nat'l Bank of Portland v. United States Bank of Portland, 100
Ore. 264, 197 P. 547 (1921); Newberry Savings Bank v. Bank of Columbia, 19 S.C.
294, 74 S.E. 615 (1912) ; First Nat'l Bank of Pukwana v. Billie Nat'l Bank, 41 S.D. 87,
168 N.W. 1054 (1918). In Massachusetts, Price v. Neal is held to be law, not by
judicial construction of G.L. c. 107, § 85, NIL § 62, but as a principle of the common
law which was unaffected by the uniform statute. South Boston Trust Co. v. Levin, 249
Mass. 45, 143 N.E. 816 (1924).
9 First Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls v. First Nat'l Bank of Borger, 37 S.W.2d 802
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
10 Gloucester Bank v. Salem Bank, 17 Mass. 33, 42 (1820), "If the loss can be traced
to the fault or negligence of either party, it should be fixed upon him."; National
Bank of North America of Boston v. Bangs, supra note 4, at 444; First National Bank
of Danvers v. First National Bank of Salem, supra note 6, at 283, 24 N.E. at 45,
"In the absence of actual fault on the part of the drawee, his constructive fault in not
knowing the signature of the drawer, and detecting the forgery, will not preclude his
recovery from one who took the check under circumstances of suspicion, without proper
precaution, or whose conduct has been such as to mislead the drawer, or induce him
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The Trust Co. argued, inter alia, (1) that since the check was a bearer
instrument13 and the indorsement "Ralph Scola" was thus superfluous, its
failure to require identification of the person presenting the check and to
compare the indorsement with the real Scola's file signature was therefore
not negligence; and (2) that National should be charged with actual fault"
in that its negligence, in crediting the Trust Co.'s clearing house balance,
charging the conservator's account and in delaying so long before discov-
ering the forgery, was the sole proximate cause of the loss suffered by it.
Further, that since National had available to it an easy means of protecting
itself," its failure to take this simple precaution when it was obvious that
the purported drawer was not a depositor or customer of the bank was
ample evidence of lack of care of National for its own circumstances.
Danvers18
 presented a singularly similar fact situation and its holding
would seem to nullify the Trust Co.'s first contention. The court said:
"It [plaintiff] bad a right to believe that the defendant, in cashing
the check purporting to be drawn by one not its own customer .. .
had by the usual and proper investigation satisfied itself of its
authenticity. The indorsement, which was not necessary to the
transfer of the check, was a guaranty of the signature of the
drawer, and the plaintiff had a right to believe that the indorser
was known to the defendant by proper inquiry." 17
Phase two of the Trust Co.'s argument in the present case was also rejected
by the court. It exonerated National of actual fault by adopting the trial
judge's findings that:
4‘ 
. . there was no contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff . .. that had any causal relation with the acts that
eventually led to the damages sustained.""
18 As
 such it would be negotiable by delivery alone and without the necessity of
indorsement by the bearer.
19 The theory was that no harm came to the plaintiff until it honored the check
and the time for returning the same pursuant to the clearing house rules had elapsed.
15 National, when it received the telephone call from the Trust Co.'s teller, could
in some manner, significantly, have marked the Conservator's account records so that
the check would never be charged against the account. This would insure that it would
never be subject to any loss as a result of the check in question. It would protect the
plaintiff against that possibility if the defendant or another party would present the
check for payment.
18 Supra note 6.
17 Supra note 6, at 284, 24 N.E. at 45. The courts are not in agreement on this point.
Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Bank of Rutherford, 115 Tenn. 64, 88 S.W. 939 (1905)
[explained in Farmers' National Bank of Augusta v. Farmers' National Bank of Mays-
ville, 159 Ky. 141, 166 S.W. 986 (1914)1 holds that it is not negligence to take a bearer
check from an unidentified person.
18 Although the trial judge found that the plaintiff erred in receiving the check
upon the clearing house balance, he held that the error was not the cause of the loss,
since if the plaintiff had disclaimed the check the defendant "would have been the party
damaged by the ... (conduct) of its own teller." The judge also found that the plain-
tiff erred in debiting the amount of the check to the Conservator's account. He found,
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It is believed that the decision is correct under the existing common
law of Massachusetts. 19
The Uniform Commercial Code, now law in Massachusetts2° and eight
other states,21 provides in Section 3-302 that a "holder in due course" is:
. . a holder who takes the instrument (a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and (c) without notice that it is overdue or
has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on
the part of any person."
It is submitted that the Trust Co., in the instant case, would be con-
sidered a "holder in due course" under the Code since it took the check
for value22 and in good faith22 and the facts do not show that it had notice
as defined in Section 3-304. 24 In this circumstance, it would seem that
however, that this mistake was not harmful to the defendant. In support of this con-
clusion the judge said that it was true that National, upon discovery of the fraud, was
under a duty to notify the defendant in order to reduce any loss that might result, but
that National had performed this duty with dispatch. The Trust Co.'s claim that plain-
tiff's prompt return of the check would have enabled it to more quickly investigate
and ascertain the identity of the imposter, was dismissed by the trial judge on the
ground that the claim was only in the realm of possibility and not of probability. The
judge's conclusions seem at first blush to be based on "boot-strap" reasoning until it is
understood that in a case like the present one, the court is determining who shall bear
the loss. Even though it appears that the plaintiff is already "out-of-pocket," it seems
that the court considers the loss as suspended in air until it determines who caused it
and thus who will be required to bear it. The result of this approach is that although
the plaintiff has seemingly already incurred a loss, since the damage was done when
the forger walked out of the defendant's bank with the money and since defendant's
negligence allowed this damage, the defendant must bear the loss which descends and
attaches to it as soon as the court determines that defendant's negligence caused it, and
that whatever negligence was attributable to the plaintiff was not the proximate cause
of the loss.
10 Although the court does not refer to the defendant as a "holder in due course,"
it is interesting to observe that one may be a "holder in due course," even though he
received the instrument from a stranger, or was otherwise negligent in acquiring it,
provided he acted in good faith. Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law 636-42 (6th ed.
1938). Thus the right to retain the proceeds of a forged check does not follow from
the fact that the recipient was a holder in due course; it must also appear that he was
not negligent. See Brannan, supra, at 771. Professor Britton says that, "The explanation
can be found possibly in the fact that the techhical rule as to who are holders in due
course is not involved in the Price v. Neal situation, and possibly in the fact that by
making negligent purchase the basis for the drawee's recovery the court thereby narrows
the field within which the rule may operate." Britton, Bills and Notes 632 (1943).
20 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 106 {1958).
21 Pennsylvania (1953), Kentucky (1958), Connecticut (1959), New Hampshire
(1959), Rhode Island (1960), Arkansas (1961), New Mexico (1961), and Wyoming
(1961).
22 UCC § 3-303 says that a holder takes an instrument for value "(a) to the ex-
tent that the agreed consideration has been performed .. • ."
23 "Good faith" is defined in 	 3-201 as ". . . honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned."
24 UCC § 3-304 states in part that, "(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or
defense if (a) the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence of forgery or
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the Code provision applicable to the transaction would be Section 3-418
(Finality of Payment or Acceptance) which states that:
"Except for recovery of bank payments as provided in Article
on Bank Deposits and Collections (Article 4) 25 and except for
liability for breach of warranty on presentment under the pre-
ceding section, payment or acceptance of any instrument is final
in favor of a holder in due course, or a person who has in good
faith changed his position in reliance on the payment."
Section 3-418 meets the problem of the principal case head-on in Comment
(4), which states that:
"The section rejects decisions under the original Act permitting
recovery on the basis of mere negligence of the holder in taking
the instrument. If such negligence amounts to a lack of good faith
as defined in this Act (Section 1-201) 26
 or to notice under the
rules (Section 3-304) 27
 relating to notice to a purchaser of an
instrument, the holder is not a holder in due course and is not
protected; but otherwise the holder's negligence does not affect the
finality of the payment or acceptance."
Thus, under Section 3-418, once the Trust Co. is found to be a holder
in due course, the drawee-bank is precluded from recovering.
In addition, it seems that the drawee could not recover on a breach
of warranty of the genuiness of the drawer's signature, since under the
Code where the holder obtains the drawee's acceptance or payment without
knowledge (no showing that Trust Co. knew of the forgery) that the drawer's
signature was unauthorized there is no warranty as to the genuineness of
such signature running from the holder to the drawee-bank. 25
 Nor could
the drawee recover on the theory of breach of warranty of the genuineness
of prior indorsements. The Code does not require an indorsement for a
bearer instrument,29
 and so it seems that the Code's provision that one
who obtains payment of a draft warrants the genuineness of any indorse-
ments through which he claims to hold is inapplicable to bearer paper, even
if, as here, the bearer has indorsed.
It is believed that the UCC modified existing law to such an extent
alteration, or is otherwise so irregular as to call into question its validity, terms or
ownership or to create an ambiguity as to the party to pay ...."
25 This section is limited by the bank collection provision (§ 4-301) permitting a
payor to recover a payment improperly paid if it returns the item or sends notice of
dishonor within the limited time provided in that section, but it is submitted that
§ 4-301 would not affect the decision of a question like the present one.
26 Supra note 23.
27 Supra note 24. Notice is also defined in § 1-201; "A person has notice of a fact
when (a) he has actual knowledge of it; or (b) be has received a notice or notification
of it; or (c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question
he has reason to know that it exists."
28 UCC § 3-417. See also { 4-207.
29 UCC § 3 - 202.
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that the present case would have been decided differently if the cause of
action had arisen after the Code had been enacted. If this be the case,
one wonders why the court failed to seize upon this opportunity to render
a decision in consonance with current legislative thinking in this area of
the law.
ROBERT F. MCGRATH
Article and Book Review Editor
Constitutional Law—Due Process—Single Act Statute Will Subject
Foreign Corporation to State Jurisdiction.—Atkins v. Jones El Laugh-
lin Steel Corp.1 —Jones & Laughlin, a Pennsylvania corporation,2 manufac-
tured liner and metal containers, and sold them to the defendant Montanin Co.,
a New York corporation, for use by Montanin's agents in bottling and label-
ing a hydrofluorsilicic acid, for subsequent resale by Montanin Co. Montanin
had no agent, office, or qualification as a foreign corporation in Minnesota,
and its only contacts in that state consisted in shipment of its product
F.O.B. New York upon direct order from resident consumers, or indirect
order from resident independent distributors. Operations had been carried on
in this manner in Minnesota for fifty years, Montanin accepting all orders
in New York, and billing consumers direct. Although the independent dis-
tributors did receive commissions on sales from their orders, there was al-
legedly no implied or express contractual relationship between them and
Montanin. The plaintiff, a truck driver for a Minnesota carrier for the de-
liveries in Minnesota, was injured as a result of inhaling toxic fumes
allegedly produced by leakage from a faulty container of acid. The suit was
commenced pursuant to a Minnesota statute which provided that commis-
1 104 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1960).
2 The defendant Jones & Laughlin had no agents, made no contracts, and main-
tained neither an office nor solicitors in Minnesota. In fact its only connection with the
principal case is that it manufactured the container for Mon tanin's acid, and allegedly
inspected same without due care, since there was evidence that one of them was faulty—
thus the claim against Jones & Laughlin on the basis of manufacturer's liability. This
defendant did not appear in the case either specially to challenge jurisdiction, or to
plead to the merits, and therefore suffered judgement by default as to the jurisdictional
issue. It is submitted that this judgement might be challenged in another forum should
action on a judgment be sought after successful trial on the merits still pending.
a Minn. Stat. Ann. § 303.13, subd. 1 (1957). "A foreign corporation shall be sub-
ject to service as follows:
(3) If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Minnesota to
be performed in whole or in part by either party in Minnesota, or if such foreign cor-
poration commits , a tort in whole or in part in Minnesota against a resident of Minnesota,
such acts shall be deemed to be doing business in Minnesota by the foreign corporation
and shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment by the foreign corporation of the
Secretary of the State of Minnesota and his sucessors to be its true and lawful attorney
upon whom may be served all lawful process in any actions or proceedings against the
foreign corporation arising from or growing out of such contract or tort . . . the mak-
ing of the contract or the committing of the tort shall be deemed to be the agreement
of the foreign corporation that any process against it which is so served upon the
Secretary of State shall be of the same legal force and effect as if served personally
within the State of Minnesota."
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